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Abstract. The present study discusses some important questions on arbitration in Latin-
America focusing on the issue of appointment and challenge of arbitrators. The author attempts 
to describe some characteristic features of arbitration in Latin-America paying particular 
attention to the impact of the Calvo Doctrine and Calvo Clause. The author also discusses the 
significance of the so-called compromiso (or in Portuguese: compromisso). The author gives a 
detailed analysis on the appointment and challenge of arbitrators in the legal system of 
Argentina, Brazil, Chile and Mexico, highlighting also some leading cases in this issue. The 
study enumerates some important arbitration institutes in these countries, as well. The author 
puts emphasis on introducing the legal regulation on arbitration of the foregoing countries taking 
into consideration the legal tradition, which might have significant influence on the present 
legislation and legal practice, as well. As the law on arbitration in some of the foregoing 
countries in many aspects follow the regulations of UNCITRAL Model Law, the author tries to 
compare the analyzed acts with the UNCITRAL Model Law, which served and serves as a 
guideline for arbitration law in several countries of Latin America. 
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I. 
  
It is obvious that the South American legal systems, specifically the develop-
ment of private law were influenced to a high extent by the European legal 
traditions–including Roman law.1 The international commercial arbitration, 
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 1 For the subsequent history of Roman law in South America, see: Hamza, G.: Az 
európai magánjog fejlődése. A modern magánjogi rendszerek kialakulása a római jogi 
hagyományok alapján [Trends of the Development of Private Law in Europe. The Role of 
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the dispute resolution method2 which won particular popularity in the European 
and American legal systems in the previous century, however, remained playing 
different role in the Latin American region in the recent past and to some extent 
in the present time. 
 Alejandro M. Garro in his essay published in the 1980’s puts that South 
American legislation does not provide favourable conditions for arbitration.3 
As it is noted by Claudia Frutos-Peterson in a publication in 2002, it is long 
established within the field of international law that the Latin American region 
is unwilling to use this dispute resolution system. In Frutos-Peterson’s view, 
the legislation related to international commercial arbitration is not as “healthy” 
as it could be.4 Taking into consideration these remarks, in the present study I 
deal with the South American commercial arbitration focusing on certain 
issues concerning the appointment and challenge of the arbitrator, considering 
the novel tendencies of legislation. In this essay I also analyse the regulations 
of Argentina, Brazil, Chile and Mexico separately. 
 If we scrutinize the history of international commercial arbitration it may 
seem odd to state that international commercial arbitration is often applied 
between the foreign investor and the host state, or one of the entities of the 
host state or a business domiciled in the host state. This can be interpreted 
together with the traditional advantages of commercial arbitration.5 Foreign 
investors, however, can only resort to international commercial arbitration as 
an alternative dispute resolution method if the appropriate legal conditions are 
                                                     
the Civilian Tradition in the Shaping of Modern Systems of Private Law]. Budapest, 2002. 
275–276. For the relationship between the Latin American legal systems and Roman law 
see: Catalano, P.: A ma is élő római jog: a világ nagy jogrendszerei és a római jog [Roman 
Law Still Existing Nowadays: The Most Important Legal Systems and Roman Law]. In: 
Tanulmányok a római jog és továbbélése köréből. I. Budapest, 1987–1988. 
 2 As it was noted by Iván Szász in an interview: “It has an eminent national and inter-
national career [i.e. commercial arbitration] which is still going on.” See: http://vg.hu/ 
index.php?apps=cikk&cikk=116366.  
 3 Garro, A. M.: Enforcement of Arbitration Agreements and Jurisdiction of Arbitral 
Tribunals in Latin America. Journal of International Arbitration, 1 (1984) 320. 
 4 Frutos-Peterson, C.: International Commercial Arbitration in Latin America: As 
Healthy as It Could be? See: www.texasadr.org/intlarb.cfm. 
 5 For the advantages of arbitration particularly see: Gellért, Gy.: Új törvény a válasz-
tottbíráskodásról [New Act on Arbitration]. Magyar Jog, 45 (1995) 451–452. From the 
subsequent Hungarian literature about the international commercial arbitration and its 
importance, see: Horváth, É.–Kálmán, Gy.: A nemzetközi eljárások joga, különös tekin-
tettel a választottbíráskodásra [Law of International Procedures, Especially Arbitration]. 
Budapest, 1999; Vörös, I.: A nemzetközi gazdasági kapcsolatok joga [Law of International 
Commercial Relations]. III. Budapest, 2004. 266–275. 
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available. The legal systems in South America are not homogeneous–in spite 
of the considerable linguistic similarity. We can state, however, that South 
American legal systems were averse to foreign investors up until the latest 
legislation. 
 We can ascertain that the theoretical basis for this phenomenon is the so-
called Calvo Doctrine. The Doctrine was established by Carlos Calvo, a 
diplomat and legal scholar in Argentina in the 19th century.6 The Calvo Doctrine 
says that foreign investors shall be under the jurisdiction of the country where 
they invest into, therefore they shall be subject to the same judgement as 
persons domiciled in that country. Bernardo M. Cremades–who drew attention 
to the re-emergence of the Calvo Doctrine–summarized the importance of the 
Doctrine as follows: (i) the host state is requested by international law only to 
provide similar treatment to foreign investors and domiciled persons, (ii) the 
activities of foreign investors are governed by international law, (iii) the courts 
of the host state have exclusive jurisdiction over the disputes of the foreign 
investors.7 It is obvious that the Calvo Doctrine did not serve the emergence of 
the international arbitration. The fact that the Doctrine did not only influence the 
commercial legislation of the South American states, but even certain consti-
tutions also, illustrates the high impact of the Calvo Doctrine. The Mexican 
constitution of 1917 provides that–concerning their properties in Mexico–foreign 
investors cannot invoke the aid of their own government. Regarding the fact that 
Mexico is a member of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), 
this provision shall not be applied in relation to the member states of the 
agreement. It shall be noted that Luis Maria Drago also went along with the 
Calvo Doctrine. Drago–who was a diplomat, lawyer and foreign minister in 
Argentina–established the Drago Doctrine which prohibited the aggressive 
efforts of foreign states to recover debts.8 
 The Bolivian constitution still contains the provision which provides that 
natural persons and undertakings are under the Bolivian jurisdiction; therefore 
they cannot claim any extraordinary treatment or diplomatic protection.9 The 
constitution of Colombia provides the same. By interpreting these regulations 
we can observe that it was the Calvo Doctrine and the subsequent legislation 
  
 6 See: Calvo, C.: Le droit international théorique et pratique. Paris, 1896. 
 7 See: Cremades, B. M.: Resurgence of the Calvo Doctrine in Latin America. Business 
Law International, 7 (2006) 54. 
 8 In this regard see: Grigera Naon, H. A.: Arbitration and Latin America: Progress and 
Setbacks. Arbitration International, 21 (2005) 135. 
 9 For the texts of the constitutions of the Latin American states visit www. 
georgetown.edu. 
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that substantially hindered the implementation of international commercial 
arbitration in the Latin American states. 
 Resulting from the Calvo Doctrine the so-called Calvo Clause was adopted 
in transactions related to foreign investments. This clause explicitly emphasized 
in the contracts that any dispute shall be settled by the fora of that state, based 
on the domestic legislation.10 The omission of the Calvo Doctrine was reached 
with certain bilateral agreements which were concluded in order to promote 
foreign investments. These agreements made it possible to stipulate arbitration 
in contracts. However, the influence of the Calvo Doctrine can be observed in 
early bilateral agreements too. For instance, one of such agreements (concluded 
by Argentina), provides that arbitration can only be commenced if a local 
court has already decided the case; or a particular period of time passed after a 
lawsuit had been initiated, and the court did not reach a judgement.11 This rule 
regarded the exhaustion of the opportunities for legal remedy provided by the 
state as a prerequisite of commencing arbitration. This rule is fundamentally 
contradictory to the purpose of the international commercial arbitration or the 
arbitration in general. 
 The influence of the Calvo Doctrine can be observed in relation to the Andea 
Treaty which was concluded on 30th November, 1977 by Bolivia, Colombia, 
Ecuador, Peru and Venezuela. Its purpose was the regulation of foreign invest-
ments. Decision Nr. 24 regarding the treaty excluded the application of foreign 
laws and the jurisdiction of foreign courts, including arbitral tribunals, concerning 
foreign investments and the reception of foreign technologies.12 
 
 
II. 
 
These bilateral agreements, the conclusion of certain international treaties and 
their ratification, moreover the practic e resulting from them essentially con-
tributed to the adaptation of arbitration in the Latin American region.13 
  
 10 About this usage of Calvo Clause see: Sornarajah, M.: The Climate of International 
Arbitration. Journal of International Arbitration, 2 (1991) 70 –71. 
 11 See: Cremades, B. M.: Disputes Arising Out of Foreign Direct Investment in Latin 
America: A New Look at the Calvo Doctrine and Other Jurisdictional Issues. Dispute 
Resolution Journal, 20 (2004) May–July. 
 12 See: Sanders, P.: Quo vadis arbitration? Sixty Years of Arbitration Practice. The 
Hague, 1999. 42. 
 13 Many South American countries ratified the Convention on the Settlement of 
Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of Other States (ICSID) convened in 
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 The importance of the Panama Treaty (1975) and the MERCOSUR Agree-
ment (1985)–which regards the international commercial arbitration–shall be 
emphasized. The fact that most South American countries ratified the Conven-
tion on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards of 1958 
(New York Convention) has also great importance.14 
 The purpose of the Inter-American Convention on International Commercial 
Arbitration (Panama Convention) concluded on 30th January, 1975 was to 
eliminate the obstacles which hindered the spread of international arbitration. 
The following conditions in the legislation were regarded as hindrances: (i) the 
courts refused to enforce those agreements that contained stipulation of arbitra-
tion for disputes occurring later; (ii) there were many ways to oppose the 
arbitral awards, which created an obstacle for enforcement; (iii) foreign persons 
were prohibited or prevented from acting as arbitrator;15 (iv) the requirement 
to include the stipulation of arbitration in a public instrument (i.e. authentic 
act).16 It is obvious that these circumstances and requirements made the applica-
tion of arbitration, moreover the recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards 
more onerous. These issues were capable of causing funda)–mental harm to 
the parties. 
 Among the international agreements we emphasize the importance of the 
Inter-American Convention Concerning the Extraterritorial Effect of Judge)–
ments and Arbitral Awards concluded in Montevideo on 5th May, 1979. The 
Convention was drafted in English, Portuguese and Spanish.17 
 According to Cremades, the most important obstacle–which was capable of 
hindering or even making impossible to employ arbitration–was the so-called 
cláusula compromisoria according to that, even if there was a stipula)–tion in 
the contract, arbitration could only be initiated provided the parties later 
confirmed this stipulation via compromiso (in Portuguese language: compro-
misso); in some cases, the confirmation of the compromiso by the court was 
                                                     
1965, Washington D. C. Many bilateral agreements were also concluded: for instance 
Argentina concluded 43, Chile 22, Peru 24 bilateral agreements. 
 14 The New York Convention was ratified by Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, 
Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, 
Honduras, Mexico, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay and Venezuela. Surprisingly, Brazil 
ratified only on 23rd July, 2002. 
 15 For the topic of the present essay it may be regarded as very significant. 
 16 See: Bowman, J. P.: The Panama Convention and Its Implementation Under the 
Federal Arbitration Act. www.texasadr.org/panama.cfm. 
 17 The text of the Convention: http://www.sice.oas.org/dispute/comarb/intl_conv/ 
caicmoe.asp. The Convention was originally signed by Brazil, Chile, Columbia, Costa 
Rica, Ecuador, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Dominican Republic, Uruguay and Venezuela. 
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also necessary.18 This rule is very problematic should one of the parties is 
unwilling to sign the compromiso after the emergence of the dispute. The refusal 
of the compromiso (which in many cases contains essential information regarding 
the appointment of the arbitrator) can create an obstacle to the settlement of 
the dispute via arbitration. In some countries there is a way to establish the 
compromiso with the intervention of the state court system; if such a solution 
does not exist, the arbitration cannot be commenced.19 It should be noted that 
the origin of the compromiso can be traced back to the compromissum in 
Roman law aimed at the appointment of the arbitrator.20 
 The issue related to the compromiso caused many controversies even after 
the conclusion of the Panama Convention. For instance, in Brazil, the Supreme 
Court of São Paulo ruled in a case between Brazilians and companies from 
France and other European countries on 16th September 1999 that the stipula-
tion of jurisdiction of the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) in a 
contract is valid and enforceable independently of any additional confirmation 
or agreement, therefore a separate compromiso is not a condition of employing 
arbitration.21 
 Robert Layton in the first half of the 1990’s summarized the still existing 
obstacles which hindered the spread of commercial arbitration in South 
America. Layton found that the impressions according to which international 
commercial arbitration was impractical, uncertain, expensive and hard to 
enforce were still discoverable in the region.22 It is also notable concerning the 
present essay that–according to Layton–the stipulation of arbitration was also 
problematic because a very limited number of people were allowed to be 
  
 18 See: Resurgence of the… op. cit. 57. 
 19 With respect to this see : Sanders: Quo vadis arbitration? op. cit. 41. 
 20 For the Roman law definition of the compromissum (which is the agreement of the 
parties submitting their dispute under the jurisdiction of the appointed judge) in the 
Hungarian literature see: Földi, A.–Hamza, G.: A római jog története és institúciói [History 
and Institutions of Roman Law]. Budapest, 2008. 13. ed, 544. For a summary of the 
arbitration in the Roman law, see: Kaser, M.: Das römische Zivilprozessrecht. München, 
1996. 2. ed. 639–644. For a detailed study on the arbitration in the Roman law, see: Ziegler, 
K. H.: Das private Schiedsgericht im antiken römischen Recht. München, 1971. For a review 
on this work, see: Schmidlin, B.: Ziegler, K. H.: Das private Schiedsgericht im antiken 
römischen Recht. Savigny Zeitschrift Romanistische Abteilung, 91 (1974) 435–443. 
 21 See: Renault do Brazil SA and others v. Carlos Alberto de Oliveira and others. 
Quoted by: Cremades: Resurgence of the…op. cit. 62. I am dealing with this case in details 
later on. Robert Layton emphasizes that certain similarities exist between the compromiso 
and the Terms of Reference of the ICC. Layton, R.: Changing Attitudes Towards Dispute 
Resolution in Latin America. Journal of International Arbitration, 10 (1993) 128. 
 22 Layton: Same art. 132–133. 
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appointed as arbitrator due to the legislation. Layton–in order to solve this 
issue–proposed appointing the arbitrator in the arbitration clause itself.23 
(However, we should mention that this solution is very questionable resulting 
from the fact that it is possible that the elected persons no longer can act as 
arbitrators at the time of the occurrence of the dispute.) 
 The MERCOSUR (South Common Market)24 Agreement played an impor-
tant role in the spread of international commercial arbitration in South America. 
MERCOSUR was founded by the Asuncion Treaty of 1991. Currently it has 5 
member states, 5 associated members and one observer state. The MERCOSUR 
Treaty on International Commercial Arbitration was signed by the foreign 
ministers of the South Common Market on 23rd July 1998.25 This agreement 
was concluded by Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, Uruguay; ratified later by Chile 
and Bolivia. 
 There is a long-run story preceding the conclusion of the MERCOSUR 
Treaty on International Commercial Arbitration. One of the antecedents is the 
Montevideo Treaty on international procedural law (1889) that was ratified by 
Argentina, Bolivia, Paraguay and Uruguay. The Treaty was revised in 1940 by 
another Treaty signed in Montevideo. Another preceding event was the Pan-
American Conference on the minimum requirements of arbitration held in 
Montevideo in 1933.26 The Bustamante-code and the Panama Convention 
(which we already mentioned) are also important in this regard. The two direct 
antecedents are the bilateral Las Leñas Protocol (1992) regarding judicial co-
operation and the Protocol convened by the MERCOSUR member states in 
Buenos Aires in 1994 on the international jurisdiction in contractual matters.27 
  
 23 Layton: Same art. 128. 
 24 In Spanish: Mercado Común del Sur; in Portuguese: Mercado Comum do Sul; in 
English: Southern Common Market. The current members of the Southern Common Market: 
Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, Uruguay, Venezuela. Associated members of MERCOSUR: 
Chile, Bolivia, Peru, Colombia, Ecuador. Observer member is Mexico. 
 25 Spanish name of the convention: Acuerdo sobre Arbitraje Comercial International 
del MERCOSUR. 
 26 For the character as legal sources of the Bustamante-code see especially: Mádl, F.–
Vékás, L.: Nemzetközi magánjog és nemzetközi kapcsolatok joga [Private International Law 
and the Law of the International Commercial Relations]. Budapest, 1992. 82–83. About the 
Bustamante-code see: Samtleben, J.: Internationales Privatrecht in Lateinamerika. Der Codigo 
Bustamante in Theorie und Praxis. I. Bd. Tübingen, 1979. 
 27 It should be noted that the Arequipa conference played an important role in the 
unification of civil law in Latin America. The conference was held on 4th–7th August, 
1999. Its participants were Argentina, Bolivia, Peru and Puerto Rico. During the conference 
Acta de Arequipa was concluded, the fourth article of which provides that concerning the 
important areas of civil law shall be harmonized in Latin America. The basis for the 
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 The dispute settlement system of the MERCOSUR Treaty on International 
Commercial Arbitration is described by László Palotás in the Hungarian 
literature as follows: “The Mercosur dispute settlement system theoretically 
lay down the basis for adequate sanctions ruled by ad hoc board of arbitration. 
However, the member states have usually settled their disputes via political 
negotiations, often on presidential level; therefore not via arbitration. This method 
provided opportunity to retreat from the provisions of the Treaty, which regarded 
the effectiveness of the rules of integration as a function of the conformity of 
the member states.”28 According to Palotás, the MERCOSUR dispute settlement 
system cannot be analysed disregarding the political factor. 
 The MERCOSUR Treaty can be regarded as a completely unique institu-
tion, because it establishes a regional international arbitration law.29 
 It should be noted that the first MERCOSUR arbitral award of the Arbitra-
tion Tribunal was given on 1st April, 1999. In this case, the parties were the 
Brazilian and Argentine governments; the board of arbitration was composed 
of an Argentine, a Brazilian and an Uruguayan arbitrator.30 To sum up, the 
South American region is not a “hostile” region to international arbitration any 
longer according to Fernando Mantilla-Serrano.31 
 It has to be highlighted that we can consider as a significant measure of 
the acceptance of arbitration in Latin America the degree of use of the 
arbitration in contracts involving governmental entities in the region in a variety 
of commercial activities. As it is stressed in article of Paul E. Mason and Mauricio 
Gomm–Sandos, the arbitration including state or a state–owned company has 
been the subject of a “hot debate” in Brazil, as well. As it has been elaborated 
by the case law two principles are applied to consider whether a legal dispute 
                                                     
harmonization is the Roman–German origin of the South- and Central-American legal 
systems. In detail, see: Hamza, G.: Az európai magánjog…op. cit. 293. 
 28 See: Palotás, L.: Az összamerikai szabadkereskedelmi kezdeményezés. PhD-érteke-
zés [The pan-Americal free-trade initiative. PhD thesis]. http://www.lib.uni-corvinus.hu/ 
phd/palotas_laszlo.pdf. In the quotation the expression fours refers to the founders of the 
Southern Common Market (Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay és Uruguay). Venezuela joined 
MERCOSUR in 2006, based on a decision made in Caracas in July, 2006. 
 29 See in this respect: Blackaby, N.–Noury, S.: International Arbitration in Latin America: 
Overview and Recent Developments. http://www.iclg.co.uk/index.php?area=4&show_ 
chapter=767&ifocus=1&kh_publications_id=35. 
 30 See: Cattaneo, M.: Recent Developments of Arbitration in Latin America–Focus on 
Mercosur Countries: Argentina and Brazil. http://arcnet.org/arclibrary/more.php?id= 
22_0_1_0_M. 
 31 See: Mantilla-Serrano, F.: Major Trends in International Commercial Arbitration in 
Latin America. Journal of International Arbitration, 17 (2000) 139. 
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of a state or a state–owned company can be arbitrated. First one should analyze 
the principle of legality under Article 37 of the Brazilian constitution, according 
to which public assets and rights are always subject to prior legislative authori-
zation. Secondly one has to take into consideration the principle of arbitrability, 
which provides that the government could agree to arbitrate only with respect 
the so-called disposable assets (bens ou direitos disponíveis).32 
 
  
III. 
  
The legislation of the South American countries regarding arbitration is highly 
influenced by the process that in several states in the region adopt legislation 
harmonious to the UNCITRAL Model Law. 33 The purpose of these acts is 
not only harmonization, but the elimination of the obstacles hindering the 
adaptation of arbitration. 
 Another factor is the difference between the levels of the influence by the 
state courts. Also, several legal systems did not recognize the so-called 
Kompetenz-Kompetenz principle, i.e. the rule that the arbitrators can decide 
independently their competence.34 These phenomena can only partly be explained 
by the influence of the Calvo Doctrine.  
 Legislators in the region shall face several particularities concerning 
arbitration, such as the fact that certain international conventions–for example 
the already mentioned New York Convention–were adopted in completely 
different times in the South American countries. Also, there is no consensus 
about the scope of cases that can be decided via arbitration (arbitrability). 
Another particularity–being closer to the present study–is the distinction between 
the arbitraje de derecho (arbiter juris or arbiter de jure) and the amiable 
compositeur (arbitrator who judges ex aequo et bono). This distinction originates 
from traditions of continental law. In certain countries the acts regulating 
arbitration used to separate (and in certain cases they still separate) the arbiter 
  
 32 See in that regard the case Companhia Paranaense de Energia v. UEG Arancaria 
Ltda. See: Mason, P. E.–Gomm-Santos, M.: New Keys to Arbitration in Latin-America. 
Journal of International Arbitration, 1 (2008) 34–35. 
 33 The UNCITRAL Model Law was compiled in 1985. See: http://www.uncitral.org/ 
uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/arbitration/1985Model_arbitration_status.html. For a brief essay 
on the Model Law: Horváth–Kálmán: A nemzetközi eljárások joga… op. cit. 65–66. For a 
comprehensive commentary on the Model Law: Binder, P.: International Commercial 
Arbitration and Conciliation in Model Law Jurisdictions. London, 2005. 2. ed. 
 34 See: Tawil, G. S.: Arbitration in Latin America: Current Trends and Recent Develo-
pments. http://www.bomchilgroup.org/argmar04.html. 
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juris (arbitraje derecho) and the arbiter ex aequo et bono. The former one had 
to strictly follow the laws (both in the aspects of substantial and procedural 
law), while latter was allowed to administer justice more freely, even adopting 
principles of natural law in his judgement. Also, this distinction can be observed 
in the appointment and even the challenge of the arbitrator.35 (However, the 
ordre public shall be respected by the arbiter ex aequo bono also.36) It should 
be noted that in several Latin American countries only persons having a law 
degree can act as an arbiter de jure.37 
 These rules–being in force only partially nowadays–highly influence the 
nature and practice of law on arbitration. In the following, we analyse (in 
different extent and fullness of details) the law concerning the appointment 
and challenge of the arbitrator in some Central and South American countries 
(Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Mexico). 
 
A) Argentina 
 
Argentina is a federal state therefore composed of provinces. The constitutions 
allows the provinces–similarly to the constitution of the United States–adopting 
independent act of procedure. In the present days, on federal level the arbitration 
is governed by certain provisions of the Code of Federal Civil and Commercial 
Procedure (Código Procesal Civil y Comercial de la Nación) which was 
promulgated in 1967.38 The states of the highest importance in Argentina (such 
as Buenos Aires) adopted independent acts concerning arbitration–however, these 
acts show high similarity to the federal code. 
 Surprisingly, arbitration is regarded by the federal code as a special court 
procedure, not an independent dispute resolution system. It should be also noted 
that only the amendment which was passed in 1981 allowed appointing foreign 
  
 35  Pieter Sanders in this respect notes that the arbitrator proceeding ex aequo et bono 
is also bound by the public policy (ordre public), therefore he also has to respect the laws 
in force. See: Sanders: Quo vadis arbitration? op. cit. 43. 
 36 See: Grigera Naón, H. A.: Arbitration in Latin America: Overcoming Traditional 
Hostility. Arbitration International, 5 (1989) 138. 
 37 Inter alia the law on arbitration of Peru (Ley General de Arbitraje) takes up this 
position. 
 38 It may be noted with respect to the name “code of civil procedure” that the Latin 
American countries (contrary to e.g. Spain) do not follow the mainly German tradition to 
use the terminology of “orders” (such as Zivilprozessordnung) to the procedural laws. In 
Latin America these acts are also called codes. See: David, R.–Brierley, J. E. C.: Major 
Legal Systems in the World Today. An Introduction to the Comparative Study of Law. New 
York, 1978. 10277. 
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board of arbitrators in cases having international aspects. Before this amend-
ment this was not possible in the Argentinean law. We can observe many 
attempts to reform the rules of arbitration. From 1990, codifying the law of arbi-
tration according to the UNCITRAL Model Law was attempted five times. 
Lately, the draft (Proyecto de Lex de Arbitraje Comercial Internacional) was 
filed in March 2005; however, none of the two chambers accepted it.39 In the 
following, we are studying the provisions of the code currently in force which 
are relevant for our topic. To some extent, we are also indicating certain provisions 
of the draft law. 
 The rules currently in force requires–besides a valid stipulation of arbitra-
tion–the compromiso, duly signed by the parties after the dispute arises as a 
confirmation of the intention to settle the dispute via arbitration. Art 740 of the 
federal procedural code defines the necessary elements of the compromiso as 
follows: 
 
 – It shall be drafted in writing indicating the date; 
 – It shall include the name and address of the parties; 
 – It shall include the names and addresses of the arbitrators; 
 – It shall include the subject of the arbitral procedure representing the 
facts; 
 – It shall mention that the party breaching the compromiso shall pay a fine. 
 
 According the Art 741 of the federal procedural code, the optional ele-
ments of the compromiso are the followings: 
 
 – Rules of the procedure; the location where the arbitrators shall proceed 
and pass the award (if this is not included, the location is the place 
where the compromiso was signed);40 
 – The timeframe available for the arbitrators to conduct the proceedings; 
 – A decision about the appointment of a secretary or leaving the appoint-
ment to the arbitrators’ discretion; 
 – Stipulate a fine in case a party initiates the nullification of the award–
excluding the situation if the parties explicitly declare the appeal off. 
 
  
 39 See: Blackaby–Noury: International Arbitration… op. cit. 
 40 It shall be noted that it is essential to differentiate between the location of the 
procedure and the passing of the award. It can give help for instance in clearing such 
questions, like when the members of an arbitral tribunal located abroad pass their award in 
the domicile of the arbitrators and not at the location of the tribunal. 
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 Provided one of the parties will not sign the compromiso–in spite of the valid 
arbitration clause–the other party has to initiate proceedings at the state court 
to substitute this statement. Therefore, the state courts have extensive rights to 
interfere in the commencement of the arbitral procedure due to the fact they are 
to take up a position on a preliminary question of the proceedings, i.e. a question 
of law. If the state court finds the requests for issuing the compromiso grounded, 
it creates the compromiso, so opens the possibility for an arbitral procedure. In 
case the motion is rejected, the cost of the procedure shall be borne by the party 
who filed the motion. 
 The compromiso, therefore, also means the agreement on the appointment 
of the arbitrators. (The fact whether the court or the parties appointed the 
arbitrator has also serious relevance regarding the challenge of the arbitrators). 
The agreement on the arbitrators is typically an issue that cannot be agreed 
on at the time of the stipulation of the arbitration; i.e. the stipulation can be 
done even years before the emergence of the dispute; therefore it is more than 
possible that the parties are not able to nominate the arbitrators. 
 It shall be noted, however, that the practice of the courts shows that the 
judges have already acknowledged in the 1980’s the stipulation of arbitration 
as being independent, therefore not linked to the compromiso and the validity 
of the contract including the stipulation. This was established by the Argentinean 
Commercial Supreme Court in a case concerning a stipulation in a contract 
concluded in Hamburg. The Court denied ruling that there is no opportunity in 
Argentina to initiate a lawsuit to appoint a board of arbitrators based on a 
contract concluded in Hamburg.41 
 The Argentinean law concerning the appointment of arbitrators is regarded 
as very special (however, not unique in South America, but inevitably peculiar). 
Second paragraph of Art 766 of the Federal Procedural Code provides that in 
lack of particular provision in the contract in this relation, the arbitrators shall 
act as arbiter ex bono et aequo, therefore proceed on the basis of the principles 
of natural law. This is why the parties are to stipulate explicitly if they are 
willing to appoint arbitrators who act as arbiter de jure (proceeding based on 
the statute law). In my opinion, the fact that the parties have to solve this 
question even in the arbitration agreement, but the arbitrators are appointed 
only in the compromiso is questionable. 
 In the Argentinean case law, the difference between the arbiter ex aequo 
bono and the arbiter de jure is also very significant. The Argentinean Commercial 
Supreme Court ruled on 4th March, 2005 that the arbiter de jure comes to his 
  
 41 See: Cámara Nacional de Apelaciones en lo Commercial–Sala, 26 September 1988; 
http://www.kluwerarbitration.com/ arbitration/arb/country/Argentina.asp. 
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decision based on his specialized and legal knowledge, in comparison with the 
arbiter ex bono et aequo who settle the dispute according to the best of his 
knowledge, even by surpassing the legal formalities.42 The judgment of the 
Commercial and Civil Court of Appeal of Formosa is also remarkably in this 
regard: the court ruled that the award of the board of arbitri ex bono et aequo 
could not be appealed against because they reached their decisions on the basis 
of natural law, not the positive law.43 
 Contrary to the above-mentioned strict rule, the Procedural Code is more 
compliant on the rule setting the minimum number of arbitrators. The parties 
shall agree on the number of arbitrators in the compromiso. The parties may 
agree on all arbitrators together, but they are also allowed appointing one arbitrator 
each, then the third arbitrator is appointed by the other two arbitrators. Art 750 
of the Code is also worth mentioning, according to which the arbitrators–
appointed by the parties–vote one from themselves as the president of the arbitral 
panel. Therefore, the chair is not necessarily the third arbitrator–appointed by 
the other two arbitrators. This rule is opposite to the rules of certain arbitral 
organizations.44 In case the parties cannot agree on the arbitrators, it is the court 
which appoints them. If a position of an arbitrator becomes vacant, the rules to 
be followed are the ones which were laid down in the compromiso. 
 According to the Argentinean law, every adult person having full capacity 
may be appointed as arbitrators. Professional judges and employees of justice 
can only act as arbitrator in cases where one of the parties is the state.45 
 We can find several distinctions in the Argentinean law concerning the 
challenge of arbitrators. The most important–which often can be observed in 
the South American legal systems–is that the arbitrators appointed by the court 
can be challenged based on the same conditions as professional state judges, 
whilst the arbitrators appointed by the parties can only be challenged due to 
facts that arose after their appointment. 
 In this regard we shall emphasize the observation of Jan Kleinheisterkamp, 
who points out the problem in the Argentinean law–similarly to other legal 
systems, for instance the Uruguayan one–that it does not deal with the situation 
clearly in which the parties do not appoint the arbitrators jointly, but they 
  
 42 See: C. Nac. Com., sala B, 04/03/2005–armex S. A. v. Application Software.; 
http://www.kluwerarbitration.com/ arbitration/arb/country/Argentina.asp. 
 43 See: Telecom Argentina Stet-France Telecom S.A. (10. 03. 2005); http://www. 
kluwerarbitration.com/ arbitration/arb/country/Argentina.asp. 
 44 See: Burghetto, M. B.: Current Status of Arbitration Legislation in Argentina. Journal 
of International Arbitration, 21 (2004) 52317. 
 45 See: Art 765 of the Federal Procedural Code. 
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each have the right to appoint one arbitrator separately. It does not seem to be 
reasonable that the other party, who has no right to interfere in the appointment 
of the arbitrator appointed by his opponent, can only challenge this arbitrator 
based on grounds arose after the appointment.46 
 As it is already mentioned, if the court appoints the arbitrators, the parties 
can initiate the challenge of an arbitrator on grounds being similar to the 
challenge of the professional judges. These are the followings: 
 
 – If the arbitrator has family relations with one of the parties or his organiza-
tional or legal representative; 
 – If the arbitrator or one of his relatives have interest in the dispute, provided 
the arbitrator has identical interest with one of the parties or his organi-
zational or legal representative, excluding the shareholders’ position in 
a public limited company; 
 – If there is legal dispute between the arbitrator and the party initiating 
his challenge; 
 – If the arbitrator is the creditor, the debtor or guarantee against one of the 
parties, excluding professional banks; 
 – If the arbitrator against the party, or the party against the arbitrator 
performed denunciation before the beginning of the arbitral procedure; 
 – If the arbitrator previously acted as a representative of one of the parties, 
or provided legal counsel or opinion either before or after the beginning 
of the procedure; 
 – If the arbitrator was given significant advantage by one of the parties; 
 – If a friendly relationship exists between the arbitrator and one of the 
parties which makes their communication direct and close; 
 – Apparent hostility showed by the arbitrator against a party, excluding the 
situation in which there was any kind of assault against the arbitrator 
following his conduct of the case. 
 It shall be noticed that these reasons for exclusion include several ones 
that can also be found in other countries’ laws concerning arbitration and the 
procedural rules of international arbitral organizations.47 
  
 46 See: Kleinheisterkamp, J.: International Commercial Arbitration in Latin America. 
Regulation and Practice in the MERCOSUR and the Associated Countries. New York, 
2005. 214. It shall be noted that the Brazilian law governs the exclusion of the arbitrator 
appointed by the other party in a more sophisticated way. This difference is explained in 
detail later on. 
 47 See e.g. Art 7. of the Procedural Rules of the International Chamber of Commerce 
and Art 5.3 of the Procedural Rules of the London Court of International Arbitration. 
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 In case the arbitrators act as arbitri ex aequo et bono (following the explicit 
order or reserve of the arbitration agreement), initiating challenge of an 
arbitrator is only possible based on narrower scope of reasons arising after the 
appointment. For example, if there is a direct or indirect interest in the result 
of the dispute; or apparent hostility resulting from unidentifiable motive. This 
rule–which is also existent in the Uruguayan and other South American legal 
systems–is explained by Kleinheisterkamp with the greater flexibility of ex 
aequo et bono arbitration.48 
 According to Art 747 of the Argentinean Federal Procedural Code, challenge 
of an arbitrator shall be initiated at the board of arbitrators within 5 days after 
obtaining knowledge of the appointment of the arbitrator. According to Maria 
Beatriz Burghetto, this deadline is also applicable if the initiation of the challenge 
is based on a reason arose after the nomination.49 If the arbitrator does not 
renounce, the state court has to decide on the petition. The competent court is 
the one which has otherwise jurisdiction, or the court where the compromiso 
was concluded. This decision cannot be appealed. However, we shall refer to 
the interesting fact that the arbitral procedure is suspended until the court rules 
on the challenge.50 This can constitute means for obstructing the procedure. 
 Another rule worth mentioning provides that a judge–therefore an arbitrator 
also–is allowed denying the participation in the case based on incompatibility 
without disclosing the reason itself. This rule can be found not only in the 
Argentinean but also in the Brazilian law. This solution is self-evident for the 
arbitrator, because he can deny his participation without making the reason 
public.51 
 According to Art 746 of the Argentinean Procedural Code, the parties can 
agree on challenging the arbitrator; before this agreement, one of the parties 
shall file a motion of challenge. 
 The Argentinean law provides a peculiar solution for modifying the number 
of the board of arbitrators after the award. Provided the arbitrators cannot reach 
consensus concerning the award, therefore the decision is obtained via voting, in 
which the majority makes the decision on the award. If a majority cannot be 
obtained following the composition of the tribunal, another arbitrator shall be 
appointed in order to make decision.52 The number of the board necessarily 
  
 48 See: Kleinheisterkamp: International Commercial Arbitration… op. cit. 210. 
 49 See: Burghetto: Current Status of Arbitration… op. cit. 52423. 
 50 See: Art 747 of the Federal Procedural Code. 
 51 See: Art 30.2 of the Argentinean Federal Procedural Code, respectively Art 135 of 
the Brazilian Code of Civil Procedure. 
 52 See: Art 757 of the Argentinean Federal Procedural Code. 
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varies, so they can obtain majority. It shall be noted here that–on the contrary–
according to Art 25 of procedural rules of the ICC (International Chamber of 
Commerce) Court of Arbitration, the chair has the right to decide in lack of 
majority.53 
 The draft of the new procedural code contains several novelties being 
relevant also for this essay. The draft concerns the Argentinean and also the 
international arbitration (provided the location of the arbitration is in Argentina). 
The draft–in accordance with the UNCITRAL Model Law–would abolish the 
dualism of the arbitral agreement and the compromiso, using the uniform 
concept of arbitration clause. In case the parties do not agree on the procedural 
rules, the arbitrators have the right to choose the most appropriate rules. 
Another important difference in the draft is that arbitrators can only decide ex 
aequo et bono if the parties explicitly authorize them to do so.54 
 Regarding the appointment of the arbitrators, Art 10 of the draft provides 
that if the parties do not agree on the number of the arbitrators, one arbitrator 
is going to proceed. With respect to the exclusion grounds, it should be noted 
that an arbitrator shall not act in a joint arbitral procedure, excluding the 
situation if the same tribunal proceed in the other case. Therefore, one may 
challenge an arbitrator successfully if the given arbitrator proceeds in a case 
and in a joint case at the same time, and the composition of the two tribunals is 
different. The legislator is willing to ensure the impartiality of the procedure 
by this regulation. Joint case is a case in which the petitions and evidences are 
connected or the outcomes of the two cases are interrelated. However, some 
issues arise concerning the application of this rule. For instance, if the correlation 
between the two cases is not obvious, a party can initiate the challenge of the 
arbitrator–as a tactical means–at any time,55 almost, stating that he got to know 
the information just before filing the motion of challenge. 
 he draft–in accordance with the Model Law–includes the principle of equal 
treatment of the parties and due process. In accordance with these principles, 
Art 24 (3) provides that the challenge of the arbitrator can based on the fact 
that the arbitrator does not forward any communication between him and one 
of the parties to the other party. The adaptation of a rule laid down in order to 
prove the impartiality and independence of the arbitrator can create some 
hindrances. 
  
 53 Concerning the practice of the ICC, see: Schäfer, E.–Verbist, H.–Imhoos, Ch.: ICC 
Arbitration in Practice. The Hague, 2004. 
 54 For the summary of the most important changes in the draft, see: Burghetto: Current 
Status of Arbitration… op. cit. 534–535. 
 55 See: Ibid. 53166. 
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 In Argentina, one can find several renowned arbitral tribunals. The Stock 
Exchange Arbitration Court of Buenos Aires (founded in 1963), the Court of 
Arbitration at the Argentinean Chamber of Commerce and the Corn-Exchange 
Court of Arbitration (founded in 1905), which decides ex aequo et bono shall 
be referred here. The proceedings of these tribunals are determined by the legal 
framework of the Federal Procedural Code. The adaptation of the analyzed 
draft would contribute to the further development of the Argentinean arbitral 
practice. 
 
B) Brazil 
 
The Portuguese legal system has striking impact on the development of the 
Brazilian law, especially on the private law.56 (We should also mention the 
fact that the German law played also an important role in the development of 
private law–with especial regard to the civil code.57) Arbitration was not 
unfamiliar to the Brazilian law at all, since Art 160 of the Constitution (known 
as the “imperial Magna Carta”) recognized arbitration as a means of settling 
disputes. The Decree number 737 of 1850 rendered explicitly possible applying 
arbitration for merchants. It shall be noted that this Decree was abolished by 
Act 1350 promulgated on 14th September 1866. In spite of the fact that–for 
instance–in 1910 the dispute between Peru and Brazil on a conflict related to 
their borders was settled via arbitration (however, not commercial arbitration), 
until the new law on arbitration (currently in force) was adopted, the legal 
framework did not fit the needs of arbitration. The arbitration clause was not 
directly enforceable; the arbitral awards were to be homologated by the state 
judicial bodies; finally, Brazil ratified certain important international conven-
tions concerning international arbitration relatively late.58 Despite the fact that 
the Geneva Convention was signed in 1923 and ratified in 1932, the Panama 
Convention was ratified only in 1996, while the New York Convention in 
  
 56 See: Hamza, G.: A magánjog kodifikálása Brazíliában [Codification of Civil Law in 
Brazil]. Acta Faculatis Politico-Iuridicae Universitatis Scientiarum Budapestinensis de 
Rolando Eötvös Nominatae, 29 (1987) 203; Hamza, G.: Törekvések a magánjog újra-
kodifikálására Brazíliában [Approaches of the Recodification of the Civil Law in Brazil]. 
Magyar Jog, 44 (1997) 756. 
 57 See: Valladão, H.: Der Einfluß des deutschen Rechts auf das brasilianische Zivil-
gesetzbuch (1857–1922). Rio de Janeiro, 1973. 
 58 See: Brechbühl, B.: 44th Congress of the International Association of Lawyers 
(UIA) in Buenos Aires–International Arbitration Commission. Journal of International 
Arbitration, 18 (2001) 239. 
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2002.59 Until the Convention on the recognition and enforcement of arbitral 
awards was ratified by Brazil, the gap resulting from the late ratification led to 
serious problems for the arbitral practice.60 
 Prior to the act in force governing arbitration was passed, three drafts were 
presented, in 1981, 1986 and 1988. In 1991, a committee called Arbiter Operation 
was established. The final text of the draft was created in 1992 and the legislature 
passed the law in 1996. The Act 9307 on arbitration (Lei de Arbitragem) was 
promulgated by the president on 23rd September 1996 and came into force on 
24th November, 1996. This act substantially modified the legal framework of 
arbitration; concerning inter alia the enforceability of the arbitral award and 
the importance of the arbitration clause (that is analysed later in detail).61 
Before the law currently in operation was promulgated, the rules of the arbitral 
procedure had been included in the Code of Civil Procedure of 1973. 
 The Brazilian law in force follows to a great extent the provisions of the 
Model Law–regarding both the domestic and international arbitration. It has, 
however, preserved certain traditional rules that are very important for the 
practice. Therefore, the Brazilian law on arbitration can be regarded as a 
combination of the modern and traditional legislation.62 For the topic of the 
present study the questions related to the arbitration clause and the compromisso 
have great importance. Until the present legislation the conclusion of the arbitral 
agreement, the compromisso had striking importance besides the arbitration 
clause–similarly to several South American legal systems. In case one of the 
parties was unwilling to agree on the compromisso, it was the ordinary state 
court whose procedure could result in the conclusion of such agreement. It is a 
fair question, whether the party commencing arbitral procedure who acts bona 
fides may claim damages and costs at the end of the procedure of the state 
court, when the arbitral agreement is concluded. However, in the Brazilian 
practice, such claims do not exist.63 
 The act in force regulates also the compulsory elements of the arbitral 
agreement (compromisso), providing that it shall include–inter alia–the name, 
  
 59 The Panama Convention was ratified by the Regulation 1902 of 1996, while the 
New York Convention was ratified by the Regulation 431 of 2002. 
 60 Bowman holds a similar opinion. See: Bowman: The Panama Convention and… 
op. cit. 
 61 For the importance of the law on arbitration see: Lopes, S.–Sodré, A.: Arbitration 
Procedures in Brazil. In: Campbell, D.–Rodriguez, S.–Prell, B. (ed.): International Assistance 
in Judicial Matters. Ardsley, N. Y., 1999. 27–28. 
 62 See: Kleinheisterkamp: International Commercial Arbitration… op. cit. 8. 
 63 See: Gomm-Santos, M.: Arbitration in Brazil. Journal of International Arbitration, 
21 (2004) 496. 
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profession and domicile of the arbitrators. If the arbitration clause was concluded, 
however, one of the parties will not agree on the compromisso, Art 7 of the act 
may be applied saying the other party can commence a procedure at the ordinary 
state court. This court provides an oral hearing and decides on the compromisso 
arbitral. During the oral hearing the court tries to convince the parties to agree 
jointly on the compromisso arbitral. If the parties are unable to agree on the 
content of the compromisso arbitral, it is the court which creates it either at 
the oral hearing or within 10 days after the hearing.  
 According to Pieter Sanders this rules means the preservation of the 
compromisso. It constitutes an evidence for the legislative process in which 
the provisions of the Model Law are adopted in parallel with the traditional 
rules.64 
 At the present time, however, it is also possible–due to the influence of the 
practice, to some extent–to commence the arbitral procedure based directly on 
the arbitration clause. In this case the arbitration clause shall be the so-called 
complete arbitration clause, including–besides the submission of the parties’ 
dispute under the jurisdiction of an arbitral panel–the precise procedure of the 
appointment of the arbitrators. This standpoint was explained in the already-
mentioned Renault do Brazil SA and others v. Carlos Alberto de Oliveira Andrade 
and Others case. According to the facts of the case, in the arbitration clause 
the jurisdiction and procedural rules of the International Chamber of Commerce 
were stipulated in such a manner that the location of the arbitration was the 
USA. Considering the indicated arbitration clause included the precise rules 
for appointing the arbitrators, the Court of Appeal of São Paulo ruled that 
there was no need for concluding compromisso. In a subsequent case, a party–
based on an arbitration clause not including the appointment of the arbitrators 
(i.e. not complete arbitration clause)–was unwilling to submit a dispute under 
the jurisdiction of an arbitral panel, this is why the resolution of the court 
substituted the compromisso.65 
 Therefore, in order to conclude an arbitration clause being capable to 
completely ignore the jurisdiction of the state courts and to commence the 
arbitral procedure, the clause shall include the exact procedure of the appoint-
ment of the arbitrators. The parties can either stipulate the procedural rules of 
a certain arbitral body or they may lay down the decisive rules of the appoint-
ment. This requirement shows the essential purpose of the legislature: the 
parties submitting their possible dispute under the jurisdiction of an arbitral 
  
 64 See: Sanders: Quo vadis arbitration? op. cit. 49. 
 65 See: Americel S.A. v. Compushopping Informática Ltda. ME and Others. Quoted by: 
Gomm-Santos: Arbitration in Brazil… op. cit. 52. 
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panel shall know the entire procedure of establishing the panel, because that will 
decide the case regarding possibly very large sum in issue. 
 Concerning the legitimacy of the arbitral procedure, it is essential for the 
contracting parties to know the procedure of the appointment before the 
dispute arises; therefore, this cannot constitute basis for ignoring the arbitral 
procedure. If the parties conclude the above-mentioned complete arbitration 
clause (no further compromisso arbitral is necessary), but one of the parties 
is not willing to take part in the arbitration, the state court declares the 
enforceability of the complete arbitration clause and oblige the reluctant party 
to participate in the arbitration.  
 Concerning the procedure of the state court it is essential to recognize the 
difference between this procedure and the one based on Art 7 of the act on 
arbitration. Latter is applied if a complete arbitration clause does not exist; 
therefore the conclusion of the compromisso arbitral is necessary, however 
one of the parties will not agree on it. In the case analyzed above the conclu-
sion of the compromisso arbitral is not necessary (due to the fact that a 
complete arbitration clause exists). So, the duty of the court is to declare the 
enforceability of the complete arbitration clause in case one of the parties will 
not agree on the arbitral procedure.  
 According to Art 12 of the law on arbitration, in case the parties conclude 
the compromisso, it expires immediately, if the arbitrator refuses the appoint-
ment and the parties explicitly stated previously that they would not call for a 
substitute person. This applies if the arbitrator dies or certain circumstances 
occur that prevent him from voting. These conditions shall be taken into 
consideration when the parties conclude the complete arbitration clause or the 
compromisso. 
 According the Art 13 of the law on arbitration, every person having full 
capacity being trusted, therefore appointed by the parties may act as arbitrator. 
It is worth mentioning that the Brazilian citizenship is not a condition. The law 
requires that the number of the appointed arbitrators must be odd. If the parties 
appoint even number of arbitrators, the arbitrators can appoint one further 
person. Provided the arbitrators are unable to reach an agreement on this issue, 
the parties may commence the action of the competent state court. However, 
the law does not define timeframe for the parties to commence a procedure when 
they realize that the arbitrators cannot agree on the one further arbitrator. This 
issue shall be solved by the legal practice; however, this provision provides a 
means for the arbitrators to prolong the procedure. Provided the arbitral panel 
is not constituted by a sole arbitrator, the arbitrators elect one from themselves 
as chair of the panel. If the arbitrators are unable to agree on the chair, the law 
renders help: in this case the most elderly arbitrator will act as the chair. 
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 Art 13 (6) of the Brazilian law on arbitration concerning the impartiality 
and independence of the arbitrators follows specifically the related provisions 
of the Model Law. It provides that arbitrators shall act independently, impartially 
and carefully.66 Concerning the professional state judges, the grounds of 
exclusion are divided into two groups: absolute (strict) and less strict grounds 
of exclusion.67 This provision regards state judges; however, Art 14 of the law 
on arbitration provides that a person who is in such relation to the parties or 
the case itself that–as a state judge–would lead to exclusion shall not proceed 
as arbitrator. It is necessary to mention that this provision does not show the 
above-mentioned differentiation between strict and lesser strict grounds of 
exclusion. 
 The Brazilian law requires the arbitrators–similarly to the Model Law–to 
disclose, before they accept the assignment, any fact that would raise justified 
doubts concerning their impartiality or independence. In order to ensure fair 
trial, the law further requires equal treatment of the parties (Art 21) and that 
the arbitrators shall provide oral hearing for both parties.68 
 The Brazilian law is very clear concerning the challenge of the arbitrators, 
providing that–based on grounds having arisen before the appointment–a party 
can file motions of challenge only if he had not taken part in the appointment 
or had obtained knowledge about the certain information after the appointment.69 
These provisions creates a regulation more sophisticated than the Argentinean 
system, which provides that a party may file motions of challenge against an 
  
 66 The wording of the law on arbitration follows also that of the Model Law using the 
appropriate Portuguese expressions: „No desempenho de sua função, o árbitro deverá 
proceder com imparcialidade, independência, competência, diligência e discrição.” The 
Model Law uses the terms “impartiality” and “independence”. It shall be noted that Section 2 
of Art 21 of the Brazilian law emphasizes the requirement of impartiality, using the term 
“imparcialidade”. 
 67 The strict grounds are the “causas de implicancias”, the less strict grounds are the 
“causas de recusaciones” in the Brazilian law. These rules are regulated in Art 134–137 of 
the Procedural Code. 
 68 With respect to this, see: Blackaby, N.: Arbitration and Brazil: A Foreign Perspective. 
Arbitration International, 17 (2001) 137. 
 69 Cp. Section 2 of art 14 of the law on arbitration: „O árbitro somente poderá ser 
recusado por motivo occorido após sua nomeação. Poderá, entretanto, ser recusado por 
motivo anterior a sua nomeação, quando: a) não for nomeado, diretamente, pela parte; ou 
b) o motivo para a recusa do árbitro for conhecido posteriormente á sua nomeação.” In 
English: “An arbitrator may be challenged only for reasons which occurred after his 
appointment. However, he may be challenged for a reason which occurred before his 
appointment, when: a) he is not appointed directly by a party; or b) the reason for the 
challenge of the arbitrator becomes known after his appointment.” 
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arbitrator appointed by himself only on grounds arose after the appointment. 
In this regard, the Argentinean law does not differentiate between the separately 
and jointly appointed arbitrators; the rule applies to both groups. While this 
rule is appropriate if the arbitrators are appointed jointly by the parties, in case 
of separate appointment, it is more questionable. For the party who could not 
participate in the appointment of the given arbitrator it is not fare to refuse the 
right to challenge him on grounds arose before the appointment. 
 The motion of challenge–according to Art 20 of the law on arbitration–
shall be filed immediately after the ground for challenge arises. With respect 
to the decision making, the Brazilian law follows such a “radical” method, 
which is the stricter solution provided by the Model Law. According to this, 
the state courts cannot interfere in this case; it is exclusively the arbitral panel 
that can decide. There is no legal remedy against this decision. 
 The decision concerning the challenge of the arbitrator may only be 
challenged in the legal remedy provided against the arbitral award. Within sixty 
days of the date of service of the award a party may file for an action to have 
the award overturned–based on certain grounds.70 The party may invoke the 
lack of the arbitrators’ impartiality or independence; the text, however, does not 
follow the wording of the Model Law. Art 32 lists the grounds for declaring 
the award null and void. It includes the case when the award was given by an 
arbitrator who could not proceed as arbitrator; also, when the award was a 
result of corruption. The burden of proof–as it can be derived from Art 33–is 
on the side of the party who filed for an action. 
 It is clear that the arbitrators have serious responsibility in connection with 
the challenge of the arbitrators, because this decision highly influences also 
the award. If the arbitrators are negligent in this respect, it may lead to serious 
damages of the parties. (It should be noted that Art 17 of the law on arbitration 
orders the application of the rules governing the responsibility of persons 
having official positions.) Jan Kleinheisterkamp argues that it would have 
been a better solution to provide a legal remedy by the state judicial bodies 
against the decision concerning the challenge of the arbitrators.71  
 It should be also noted that it could take relatively a long time to enforce 
an arbitral award in Brazil. As a reason for that we can mention that the losing 
party usually attempts to challenge the award itself in front of a regular court. 
Nevertheless the regular court in most cases rejects the challenge, it can take 
significant time before the court in charge reaches such a decision. 
  
 70 Cf.: Lopes–Sodré: Arbitration Procedures in Brazil…op. cit. 27–28. 
 71 See: Kleinheisterkamp: International Commercial Arbitration…op. cit. 217. 
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 As a recent example on the challenge of arbitrator we can refer to the 
following case. The parties agreed on arbitration in São Paulo under the 
UNCITRAL rules administered by American Arbitration Association. The parties 
defined the number of the arbitrators by ruling three arbitrators, each party 
could appoint one-one arbitrator and the party-appointed arbitrators could 
select the chairperson of the tribunal. Furthermore the parties composed a 
submission agreement, in which they expressly waived any challenges to all 
arbitrators. After two years of procedure the panel issued an award. After the 
receipt of the award the losing party started judicial proceedings in order to 
have the award annulled, based on the fact that the arbitrator nominated by the 
winning party had not disclosed the fact that he had offered legal services to 
another member of the same company-group several months before the 
arbitration procedure took place. The losing party argued that it learnt this fact 
only after the award had been rendered with the help of an Internet research of 
the arbitrator’s law firm. The state court judge in São Paulo nullified the award 
based on Articles 32, II and VIII, 13, paragraphs 6 and 14 of the Brazilian law 
on arbitration. It is interesting to note the reasoning of the award, according to 
which the provisions regarding disqualification of arbitrators and judges 
cannot be derogated or modified by the agreement of the parties.72 
 The Brazilian law on arbitration combines the traditional rules and the 
provisions of the Model Law. I illustrated this approach above with some 
examples. However, the Brazilian law shall face some challenges. The Act 
11079 on the Public-Private Partnership was promulgated on 30th December 
2004. It allows settling the related disputes via arbitration; however, the 
location of the procedure shall be in Brazil and its language Portuguese. It is 
very questionable how the foreign investors will react to such provisions.73  
 
C)  Chile 
 
The fundamental changes concerning arbitration that occurred in the Latin 
American countries took place also in Chile. The legal framework, however, is 
slightly different from the above-mentioned legal systems; we can observe 
some sort of duality. Chile ratified many international conventions rather 
earlier. For instance, Chile was one of the first countries which ratified the 
New York convention (being in force in Chile from 3rd December 1975) and 
the Panama Convention; moreover, Chile ratified the Washington Convention 
on settling disputes related to foreign investments. It has been in force since 
  
 72 See in detail: Mason–Gomm-Santos: New Keys to Arbitration… op. cit. 65. 
 73 See especially: Cremades: Resurgence of the Calvo Doctrine… op. cit. 63. 
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24th October, 1991. Chile concluded a free trade agreement in 1997 with Canada; 
in 1998 with Mexico and in 2003 with the European Community, South Korea 
and the United States of America. Moreover, Chile concluded many bilateral 
agreements on the protection of the investments with a number of European 
and Asian countries.74  
 Not surprisingly, the state of the economy was also attractive to foreign 
investors. However, in spite of the ratified international conventions including 
arbitration as an alternative dispute settlement system, very old rules were 
governing arbitration in Chile until 2004. The relevant provisions of the Code 
on Civil Procedure (Código de Procedimiento Civil) of 1902 and the law on 
the judicial organization (Código Orgánico de Tribunales) of 1943 had been 
applied to arbitration. These rules were highly influenced by the Spanish law 
of the 19th century.75 Chile attempted several times to modernize the legal frame-
work governing arbitration. The draft of 1992–for example–was rejected based 
on constitutional grounds. Only in 2004 the Chilean legislature could pass the 
new law on arbitration.76 
 The draft of the law in force was brought in on 2nd June, 2003. The Congress 
passed the law on 10th August, 2004, and then it was forwarded to the Constitu-
tional Court for preliminary constitutional control. On 25th August 2004 the 
Constitutional Court ruled that no constitutional issue was found, therefore the 
new law was delivered to the President on 10th September 2004. The Act Nr 
19.971 on international commercial arbitration (Ley de Arbitraje Comercial 
Internacional) was promulgated on 29th September 2004.77 
 The new law follows the provisions of the UNCITRAL Model Law; there-
fore it is regarded as the first law governing international arbitration in Chile. 
The Chilean Juan Eduardo Figueroa Valdes emphasizes the importance of the 
law as follows: 
 
 – The law contributes to create a legal framework in Chile beneficial to 
foreign investors, therefore it increases the volume of investments;  
  
 74 Concerning these issues see: www.direcon.cl. 
 75 With respect to these two laws see: Jorquiera, C.–Helmlinger, K.: Chile. In: Blackaby, N. 
et al. (red.): International Arbitration in Latin America. The Hague, 2002. 90. 
 76 About the Chilean law on arbitration in the Spanish literature see especially: Paillas, E.: 
El Arbitraje Nacional e Internacional Privado. Santiago, 2003. albónico, E. P.: Arbitraje 
Comercial Internacional. Santiago, 2005. 
 77 Regarding the drafting of the new law on arbitration see especially: Conejero Roos, C.: 
The New Chilean Arbitration Law and the Influence of the Model Law. Journal of Inter-
national Arbitration, 22 (2005) 151–152. 
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 – The law provides rules that are in close compliance with the international 
arbitral regulations, so it encourages stipulating Chile as the location of 
the arbitral procedures; therefore it contributes to the improvement of 
the standard of the Chilean arbitral bodies.78 
 
 The Chilean legislature follows the monist concept with respect to arbitra-
tion, because the law in issue governs only international arbitration. The 
Chilean domestic arbitral processes are still regulated by the previous rules. 
This differentiation has great importance for the topic of the present essay. In 
the following, I am analyzing the provisions of the new law on international 
arbitration; however, indicating certain rules normative to domestic arbitration. 
 Concerning the concept of international arbitration the Chilean law follows 
entirely the UNCITRAL Model Law. Contrary to the previous regulations–
which are ordinary in the region–the new law does not require a second 
agreement for the arbitral procedure. Therefore, in case an arbitration clause 
exists, no further agreement shall be concluded when the dispute arises; so the 
duality of the cláusula compromisoria and the compromiso does no longer 
exists.79 
 The Chilean law follows the provisions of the Model Law regarding also 
the appointment of the arbitrators.80 According to the Chilean law on arbitration, 
the parties may agree on the number of arbitrators freely. In case they cannot 
reach an agreement on the number of arbitrators, three arbitrators shall proceed. 
This rule is compliant to the standard practice of international commercial 
arbitration. 
 First paragraph of Art 11 of the Chilean law provides that in absence of 
different agreement, arbitrators with any nationality can proceed; the law does 
not contain any prohibitive rules. According to Figueroa Valdes, if advocates 
may act as arbiter de jure only, this would lead to an ostensible contradiction, 
because the Chilean law on the judicial organization, provides that only 
Chilean citizens can act as advocates in Chile. That would mean that a foreign 
advocate could not be arbiter de jure. The contradiction is ostensible only, 
however, because the law on international arbitration explicitly provides that 
  
 78 See: Figueroa Valdes, J. E.: The New Chilean Law on International Commercial 
Arbitration (Law 19. 971). www.camsantiago.com/html/archivos/espanol/articulos. 
 79 It should be noted that Art 234 of the law on the judicial organization provides that 
the parties shall conclude–besides the arbitration clause–an agreement including certain 
necessary elements. Otherwise, the lack of such agreement hinders the arbitral procedure. 
 80 See: Art 10 of the Chilean law on arbitration (Número de arbitros–Number of the 
arbitrators), moreover Art 11 (Nombramiento de los árbitros–Appointment of the arbitrators). 
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anybody can proceed as arbitrator, irrespective of his nationality. This may 
only be limited by the agreement of the parties. Therefore, foreign advocate 
can also act as arbiter de jure in Chile. A contradictory interpretation of these 
rules would decrease the autonomy of the parties, which would violate one of 
the fundamental principles of the law governing international arbitration.81 
 According to the relevant provisions of the Chilean law, the parties may 
agree on the procedure regulating the appointment of the arbitrators freely. (It 
shall be noted here that it used to be the compromiso, the second agreement 
concerning the arbitration, which related to the procedure of the appointment.) 
Provided the parties do not reach an agreement on this issue and three arbitrators 
proceed, each party may appoint one arbitrator, and the third is appointed by 
these two arbitrators. The chair of the competent court of appeal shall decide 
on the appointment, if one of the parties does not appoint an arbitrator within 
30 days, or the two arbitrators fail to appoint the third member of the panel 
within 30 days. Provided the parties agree on a panel constituted by a sole 
arbitrator, and the parties are unable to appoint the sole arbitrator, on the 
motion of a party it is the chair of the competent court of appeal which appoints 
the sole arbitrator. If the parties, or–concerning the appointment of the third 
arbitrator–the two arbitrators who are already appointed by the parties, or a 
third person being in charge of the appointment (including arbitral organi-
zations) breach the rules of the appointment, on the motion of a party, it is the 
chair of the competent court of appeal that decides on the appointment (provided 
the agreement of the parties does not contain other provisions in this respect). 
 Section 5 of Art 11 of the law on international arbitration provides that 
these decisions of the chair of the competent court of appeal are not 
appealable. During the appointment, the required qualification of the arbitrator 
and the question of his impartiality and independence shall be taken into 
consideration. Provided that the third arbitrator or the sole arbitrator is to be 
appointed via this procedure, the possibility of appointing an arbitrator having 
different nationality than the arbitrators appointed by the parties shall be 
considered. This rule is based on the provisions of the UNCITRAL Model Law. 
 Some remarks should be made regarding the rules indicated above. Cristián 
Conejero Roos in his essay emphasizes the difference between the concept of 
the law in force (arbitrators are appointed independently by the parties) and 
the traditional concept of the law of Chile and other Latin American countries 
(arbitrators are appointed by the parties jointly).82 In connection with the 
challenge of the arbitrator, however, the Argentinean law does not differentiate 
  
 81 See: Figueroa Valdes: The New Chilean Law… op. cit. 
 82 See: Roos: The New Chilean Arbitration Law… op. cit. 156. 
 ARBITRATION IN SOUTH AMERICA–WITH SPECIAL REGARD… 203 
  
between the jointly and independently appointed arbitrators either–as it has 
been noted above. According to Conejero Roos, emphasizing the concept of 
the arbitrator appointed by the parties is very important in the Chilean law, 
because it substantially differs from the earlier concept–being parallel to some 
extent to the traditions prevailing in the Roman law–of the appointment of the 
arbitrator.83 It should also be mentioned here that the new law gives the chair 
of the court of appeal the right to decide–contrary to the former regulation, 
which delegated this right to the court of first instance. 
 In my view it ought to be also emphasized that–provided the parties did not 
agree on the procedure of the appointment and a panel of three arbitrators 
proceed–the right for the decision by the chair of the court of appeal opens after 
the thirty-day-long deadline expires. However, concerning the sole arbitrator, 
the law does not set such a deadline; it just provides that in case the parties 
cannot agree on the appointment of the sole arbitrator, on a motion of a party 
the court of appeal appoints the arbitrator. Taking into account the fact that 
there is no appeal against the decision, the rule not setting any deadline for the 
parties to appoint the sole arbitrator may allow misuse of the law. Therefore, 
the chair of the court of appeal is to be very careful in his decision concerning 
the appointment of the arbitrator, because this unappealable decision has very 
great impact on the arbitral procedure. 
 Traditionally the Chilean law differentiates between the arbiter de jure and 
the arbiter ex aequo et bono concerning the challenge of the arbitrators.84 It 
provides the same rules to the ordinary state judges and the arbiter de jure; 
while–according to certain judgements–it shall not be applied to the arbiter ex 
aequo et bono.85 
 Compliant to the Model Law the Chilean law on international arbitration 
orders the arbitrator to disclose and fact that may raise doubts concerning his 
impartiality or independence. The former law did not include such a provision. 
Art 12 of the new law provides that a party may file a motion of challenge, if 
  
 83 About the compromissum in the Roman law see: Ziegler: Das private Schieds-
gericht… op. cit. 47–77. 
 84 It is worth mentioning that the traditional Chilean law did use the concept of a 
combination of the arbiter de jure and the arbiter ex aequo et bono. This arbitrator was not 
bound by the procedural rules laid down in the law; however his award was to be based on 
the law–contrary to the award of the arbiter ex aequo et bono. See especially: Grigera 
Naón, H. A.: Arbitration in Latin America… op. cit. 139. 
 85 The consequent application of this interpretation of the two categories of arbitrators 
would lead to an undesirable differentiation. For this judgement see: CA Santiago (Oct. 
17, 1994) 91 II-2 RDJ 95, 96–97 (1994). Quoted in: Kleinheisterkamp: International 
Commercial Arbitration… op. cit. 210. 
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such doubts arise concerning the impartiality or independence of the arbitrator. 
A party who appointed or took part in the appointment of the certain arbitrator 
may file a motion for challenge based only on grounds that became known 
after the appointment. Therefore, in case the party appointed an arbitrator and 
was aware of the fact that a challenge would be grounded against the arbitrator, 
the right for challenge is regarded as renounced.86  
 The text of the Chilean law follows verbatim the expressions “independence” 
and “impartiality” of the Model Law using the Spanish words “independencia” 
and “imparcialidad”. 
 According to the new Chilean law parties are free to agree on the procedure 
of the challenge of the arbitrators. In case the parties do not stipulate such 
procedural rules, the law provides subsidiary provisions.87 According to these 
subsidiary rules a party is given 15 days following the establishment of the 
tribunal or obtaining knowledge about the ground for challenge to file a 
motion of challenge in writing at the panel. If the arbitrator does not renounce 
or the other party does not accept it (that would cancel the arbitrator’s assign-
ment), it is the panel itself that decides on the challenge. 
 The Chilean law–contrary to the above-mentioned Brazilian rules–provides 
legal remedy against such decision of the panel. Provided the procedure on the 
challenge–based on the law on arbitration or the agreement of the parties–does 
not lead to the desired result, the party who filed the motion of challenge may 
appeal against the decision. The right for the appeal is conferred on the chair 
of the court of appeal whose decision can no longer be appealed.88 In my view, 
the importance of this appeal is highly decreased by the fact that the arbitral 
procedure is not suspended by the appeal, therefore even the award can be 
reached with the participation of the arbitrator in issue. 
 It should be noted that the procedure of challenge is more complicated if 
domestic arbitration is concerned.89 Similarly to the Brazilian law, regarding 
domestic arbitration strict (causas de implicancias) and lesser strict grounds 
(causas de recusaciones) for challenge are differentiated. If one of the causas 
de recusaciones arises, the motion is decided by the state court of first instance–
this decision is unappealable. Concerning the causas de implicancias, in case 
there is sole arbitrator, it is the sole arbitrator who decides on the challenge; 
however, his decision can be appealed at the regional court. Provided the panel 
  
 86 Fernandez–Gutiérrez: Chile. In: Rowley–Mendelsohn (ed.): Arbitration World… op. 
cit. 55. 
 87 See: Art 13 (2) of the Chilean law on arbitration. 
 88 See: Art 13 (3) of the Chilean law on arbitration. 
 89 The relevant provisions are Art 115–116 of the Chilean Code on civil procedure. 
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consists of more arbitrators, the decision is made by the tribunal excluding the 
arbitrator in issue. This decision is unappealable. It is worth mentioning that 
the arbitral procedure is not suspended, just before the award is made; however, 
the arbitrator in issue cannot proceed until the decision on the challenge.90 
 It can be observed that the Chilean law is much more complicated concerning 
the domestic arbitration than the new rules on international arbitration. The new 
law on arbitration regulates the appointment and challenge of the arbitrators 
in such way that may create a framework for arbitration meeting the require-
ments of the parties participating and willing to participate. According to 
Figureoa Valdes an important step of this process was the serious limitation of 
the role of the state courts concerning international arbitration.91 
 With respect to the possibility of appeal concerning the composition of 
the arbitral tribunal, we should refer to paragraph four of Art 34 (2) a) of the 
Chilean law on arbitration. It provides that the competent court of appeal may 
declare the award null and void, provided the party filing the motion manage 
to prove that the composition of the panel (or the procedure) was not in 
compliance with the agreement of the parties, excluding the situation when 
this agreement breaches one of the cogent provisions of the law. Provided the 
parties did not conclude an agreement on the procedural rules, the invalidation 
of the award may be initiated if the composition of the panel (or the procedure) 
breaches the provisions of the Chilean law on arbitration. It shall be emphasized 
that invalidation may also be initiated–besides the above-mentioned cases–if 
the composition of the panel (or the procedure) breaches the law on arbitration 
as such. 
 One of the most important arbitral organizations is the Court of Arbitration 
at the Santiago Chamber of Commerce. The Santiago Arbitration and Mediation 
Center was founded in 1992.92 This Court of Arbitration has its own rules of 
procedure, which offers to the parties to call upon the Chamber of Commerce 
to appoint the arbitrators. Challenge of the arbitrators appointed by the Chamber 
of Commerce is also possible. Parties have six days from the appointment to 
file a motion of challenge. The motion is judged by the Council of the Chamber. 
Provided both parties agree on the challenge of an arbitrator, the exclusion 
takes places automatically, without the substantial examination of the motion. 
  
 90 For a summary see: Kleinheisterkamp: International Commercial Arbitration… op. 
cit. 210. 
 91 “At the same time, the unquestionable restriction in judicial intervention of Ordinary 
Tribunals ensures the well functioning of the international arbitral system in Chile.” See: 
Figueroa Valdes: The New Chilean Law… op. cit.  
 92 http://www.camsantiago.com/en/index.htm. 
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If one of the parties does not agree, the Council makes the decision after holding 
an oral hearing. This decision of the Council is unappealable.93 In my view, the 
rules of procedure of the Court of Arbitration at the Chilean Chamber of 
Commerce essentially respect the autonomy of the parties. 
 The Arbitration and Mediation Center of the Chilean-American Chamber 
of Commerce plays also an important role in Chile. The rules of procedure of 
this arbitral organization contain also important rules on the challenge of the 
arbitrators. Art 11 provides that parties may file motions of challenge if they 
obtain knowledge about concerns related to the impartiality or independency 
of an arbitrator. The deadline for this motion is 15 days from the appointment 
of the arbitrator.94 
 
D) Mexico 
 
Similarly to many Latin American countries, the Calvo Doctrine also played 
an important role in the development of the Mexican commercial arbitration.95 
Not surprisingly, serious changes of the system of the 19–20th centuries took 
place in the 1990’s. One of the essential reasons of this phenomenon is–
similarly to many other Latin American countries–the ratification of different 
international conventions. Mexico ratified the New York Convention in 1971 
and it also became a member of the Panama Convention. In 1986 Mexico 
joined the Montevideo Convention. As it is already mentioned, Mexico is an 
observer state of the MERCOSUR. The importance of the free-trade agree-
ments concluded by Mexico in the development of the Mexican law on 
arbitration shall also be noted. Special emphasis shall be laid on The North 
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), whose members include Mexico. 
The Agreement provides that an investor of a member may initiate arbitral 
procedure directly against a member state. (Mexico has this rule in several 
other free-trade agreements also.)96 
 The US-Mexico Conflict Resolution Center plays very important role in 
the development of the arbitration practise in Mexico. This non-profit organi-
zation was founded in 1994 at the State University of New Mexico. The 
  
 93 For all these rules see Art 8–10 of the rules of procedure: http://www.camsantiago. 
com/html/english/index.htm. 
 94 See in this regard: http://www.amchamchile.cl/node/1456;http://www.amchamchile. 
cl/node/1108. 
 95 For a good summery on the Mexican arbitration law in Spanish see: Uribarri 
Carpintero, G.: El arbitraje en México. Mexico City, 1999. 
 96 Wobeser, C. V.: Mexico. In: Rowley, J. W.–Mendelsohn, Mc. B. (ed.): Arbitration 
World. Jurisdictional Comparisons. London, 2006. 2. edition. 206. 
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organization was founded in order to contribute to the development compliant 
with the international trends of the Mexican-American arbitration practise.97 
 The fundamental rules on arbitration are included in the code of commerce 
(Código de Comercio). The code was amended by a regulation promulgated on 
4th January, 1989 with a new Chapter four of the Fifth Book regulating arbitra-
tion.98 In spite of the fact that these rules already followed the provisions of 
the UNCITRAL Model Law, they were substantially amended in 1993. The 
regulation promulgated on 22nd July 1993 provided rules on arbitration being 
much more flexible to the parties. A novelty being important for the topic of 
the present essay provides that the parties are free to choose the language of 
the procedure different from Spanish; also the location of the arbitration and 
they are also free to define the number of the arbitrators.99 
 The Mexican law differentiate between the arbitrators proceeding based on 
statute law, the arbiter de jure (derecho) and the arbitrators deciding on the basis 
of fairness, the arbiter ex aequo et bono (de conciencia).100 The provisions 
concerning the appointment and challenge of the arbitrators are included in 
Art 1426–1431 of the Mexican Código de Comercio. According to these 
rules, the parties are free to choose the number of the arbitrators. If such an 
agreement does not exist, a sole arbitrator proceeds. The legal practise requires 
that the number of the arbitrators shall be odd (número non), in order to create 
a functioning panel.101 The law does not provide any limitation regarding the 
nationality of the arbitrators. The parties are free to define the procedure of 
appointment. Provided the parties are unable or unwilling to agree on this 
issue, the law provides subsidiary rules. The sole arbitrator is appointed by the 
judge of the state court if the parties cannot agree on his appointment. If the 
panel consists of three arbitrators, each party appoints one arbitrator, and the 
third (the chair) is appointed by these two arbitrators. Provided a party does 
not appoint an arbitrator within 30 days after the call for doing so, or the two 
arbitrators–appointed by the parties–are unable to appoint the third arbitrator 
  
 97 See: www.nmda.nmsu.edu. 
 98 See in this regard: Hoagland, A. C.: Modification of Mexican Arbitration Law. 
Journal of International Arbitration, 7 (1990) 91–100. 
 99 See: ITA NEWS & NOTES “Mexican Commercial Code Amendments Further 
Liberalize Arbitration Law”. http://faculty.smu.edu./pwinship/arb-17.htm. About the amend-
ment of 1993 see further: Drafting and Enforcement of International Arbitration Clauses in 
Mexico and the United States. See: www.mexicolaw.com/LawInfo01.htm. This article 
includes samples of the recognized clauses. 
 100 About this differentiation see especially: Penner, V.: Development of Arbitration. 
In: Arizona Civil Remedies Seminar (October, 1999.). www.cidra.org/articles/newway.htm. 
 101 See: Penner: Quoted art. op. cit. 
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within 30 days, it is the state court that is going to appoint the chair of the panel 
on a motion of a party. If the parties reached an agreement on the procedure 
of the appointment; however, one of the parties, or the already appointed 
arbitrators, or a third person–including institutions–did not complete his duties, 
the court may interfere in the procedure according to the purpose of the 
procedural order. 
 In spite of the fact that one of the aims of the amendment of the Mexican 
law on arbitration was the diminution of the role played by the state courts,102 
we should refer to the fact that there is no appeal against the above-mentioned 
decisions of the judge of the state court. According to the law, the judge–when 
appointing an arbitrator–has to take into consideration the necessary qualifica-
tion of the arbitrator and any other circumstances that are capable of assuring 
the impartiality and independence of the arbitrator. Despite the fact that the 
law explicitly provides that anybody–irrespective of his nationality–may be 
appointed as arbitrator,103 in case a state judge decides on the appointment, he 
shall appoint an arbitrator having different nationality from the parties. While 
the aim of the previous rule is to provide freedom to the parties concerning 
nationality of the arbitrators, the purpose of the latter is to provide that the 
arbitrator having dominant position is impartial and independent 
 It can be observed in the above-mentioned rules that the Mexican law does 
not require any specific qualification for the arbitrators; however, the certain 
person has to be of full age and have full capacity. We should mention here 
that in some other Latin American countries the legislature explicitly includes 
specific requirements for becoming arbitrator in the law concerning the 
appointment of the arbitrator. For instance, second paragraph of Art 480 of the 
Uruguayan Code of civil procedure in force (Ley N. 15982 Codigo Gerenal 
del Proceso) provides explicitly that arbitrators shall be over 25 and have full 
capacity.104 
 Certain international conventions–also ratified by Mexico–may provide further 
requirements concerning the qualification of the arbitrators. The North American 
Free Trade Agreement–for instance–requires that the arbitrator proceeding in 
  
 102 See: ITA NEWS & NOTES „Mexican Commercial Code… op. cit. 
 103 See: Art 1427 of the Codigo de Comercio. 
 104 See: Ley N. 15982 Codigo General del Proceso, Art. 480 (Arbitros): „2. Puede ser 
árbitro toda persona mayor de veinticinco años de edad, que se halle en el pleno goce de 
sus derechos civiles.” These requirements (age 25, full civil capacity) are explicitly 
included in the part concerning the appointment of the arbitrators. 
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disputes between an investor and a member state has to be familiar to inter-
national law and investment affairs.105 
 Concerning the impartiality and independence of the arbitrator, the Mexican 
code strictly follows the relevant provisions of the UNCITRAL Model Law;106 it 
provides that the arbitrator has to disclose any information before the appoint-
ment that may raise concerns regarding his impartiality or independence. After 
the appointment, the arbitrator still has to disclose any such information, until 
the end of the procedure–if the parties did not obtain knowledge of the given 
fact. If the party appointed an arbitrator or took part in the appointment, he 
may file a motion of challenge against this arbitrator based only on grounds he 
noticed after the appointment. 
 The challenge may only be initiated in the existence of facts raising 
grounded doubts concerning the impartiality or independence of the arbitrator; 
or, provided the arbitrator does not have qualifications having been required 
by the parties. The interpretation of this rule–which follows the provisions of 
the Model Law–leads to an interesting question: what is the procedure to be 
followed if a qualification is required by an international convention but the 
parties did not include such rule in their agreement. However, we will not find 
explicit answer in the law; presumably challenge may be initiated based on the 
above-mentioned provisions. 
 Similarly to the appointment of the arbitrator, the parties are free to define 
the procedure of the challenge of the arbitrators. In case such an agreement 
does not exist, the party initiating the challenge shall file a motion of 
challenge in writing at the panel within 15 days after he obtained knowledge 
on the composition of the panel or the ground for challenge. If the arbitrator 
does not renounce or the other party does not accept it, it is the panel itself that 
decides on the challenge. The party filing the motion may appeal against this 
decision at the court within 30 days. The court makes an unappealable decision 
on this issue. The arbitral procedure is not suspended by the procedure of the 
court; the arbitrator in issue may also participate; moreover, even the award 
may be given. This provision follows the Model Law; however, the latter is 
substantially different concerning the fact that in the Model Law, it is not only 
the court that may decide on the appeal.107 
  
 105 See: Wobeser: Mexico… op. cit. 209–210. 
 106 For the relevant parts of the commentary on the UNCITRAL Model Law see: 
Binder: International Commercial Arbitration… op. cit. 116–117. 
 107 See: Binder: International Commercial Arbitration... op. cit. 124. The evident purpose 
of the above-mentioned distinctions is to ensure the applicability of the Model Law in 
different legal families. 
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 Art 1457 of the Mexican law regulates the nullification of the award. We 
should emphasize the rule which provides that such procedure may also be 
initiated on grounds that the composition of the panel (or the procedure) did 
not comply with the agreement of the parties; excluding the situation when 
this agreement breached one of the cogent provisions of the law. Provided the 
parties did not conclude an agreement on the procedural rules, the invalidation 
of the award may be initiated if the composition of the panel (or the procedure) 
breaches one of the rules of Art 1457.108 We should refer here to the judge-
ment of the 25th Civil Court of the Federal District on 12th June, 2001.109 The 
plaintiff initiated the nullification of an award of the ICC Court of Arbitrator, 
based on–inter alia–certain concerns regarding the impartiality of the 
arbitrator. The Mexican court dismissed the case. It reasoned that the ICC had 
already dismissed the motion of challenge filed during the arbitral procedure, and 
the plaintiff did not appeal this decision at the state court, in spite of the fact 
that such option was granted by Art 1429 of the Mexican Code of Commerce 
(following the Model Law).110 
 
 
IV. 
 
I presented certain essential features of the law concerning arbitration of the 
Latin American states, with special emphasis on the appointment and challenge 
of the arbitrators. It can be observed that–until the recent past–many factors 
(including political ones) contributed to the regulation and practise of com-
mercial arbitration. (I did analyze in details the Calvo Doctrine in this regard.) 
The striking influence of the UNCITRAL Model Law of 1985 is obvious in 
the recent legislation of the states of the region. 
  
 108 We should emphasize the difference between the solution for legal remedy and the 
concept of amparo. The amparo is a constitutional appeal that may be filed at the federal 
court against a judgement of a state court in a nullification or enforcement procedure, if 
the judgement breaches a personal right protected by the constitution. See: Wobeser: 
Mexico. op. cit. 217. 
 109 The judgement is: http://www.kluwerarbitration.com/ arbitration/arb/country/ 
Mexico.asp. 
 110 Art 1429 of the Mexican Code on commerce–following the Model Law–provides that 
the party filing the motion of challenge are given 30 days after receiving the refusal of his 
motion to appeal at the state court. The decision of the court shall not be appealed. The 
arbitral procedure is not suspended by the procedure of the court; the arbitrator in issue 
may also participate; moreover, even the award may be given. 
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 The new laws and drafts based on the UNCITRAL Model Law faced (and 
still face) different challenges due to–besides the above-mentioned political 
factors–the legal traditions. One of these challenges is the still existent dif-
ferentiation between the domestic and international arbitration. The duality of 
the arbitration clause and the arbitration agreement (the clausula compro-
misoria and the compromiso arbitral) and the efforts to put an end to this duality 
in order to facilitate the arbitral procedure are also important. The principle 
according to which arbitrators are appointed jointly and not independently by the 
parties has also traditional basis. The rules governing the appointment and 
challenge of the arbitrators are determined by the dichotomy of the arbiter de 
jure and the arbiter ex aequo et bono. The efforts of the legislatures to unify 
the law on arbitration have to face these phenomena also. The fact that rules 
concerning the appointment and challenge of the arbitrators, moreover the 
possible legal remedies are still different to some extent in the region (i.e. in 
the countries examined in the present essay) shows that the process of creating 
a uniform system for arbitration has not reached an end yet.  
 In conclusion, it can be established that the efforts to unify the law on arbi-
tration–that have already materialized in the laws, the legal practice and the 
completed drafts–substantially contributed to create a more coherent legal frame-
work concerning international arbitration. Due to this process, international 
commercial arbitration, as an alternative dispute settlement system became 
popular among domestic and foreign investors in the region.111 
 
  
 111 It is interesting to mention that the spread of the arbitration in the Latin American 
region also resulted in the formation of an informal, but well–known “Arbitration Bar”, 
including lawyers and law firms from the region and also from Europe and the United 
States. In Brazil the activity of the Brazilian Arbitration Committee (“CBAr”) should be 
mentioned, which has its own journal dealing with arbitration (Revista Brasileira de 
Arbitragem). See in detail: Mason–Gomm-Santos: New Keys to Arbitration… op. cit. 63. 
